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BY RUCHIRA S. DATTA1
ABSTRACT. Every real algebraic variety is isomorphic to the set of totally mixed
Nash equilibria of some three-person game, and also to the set of totally mixed Nash
equilibria of an N-person game in which each player has two pure strategies. From
the Nash-Tognoli Theorem it follows that every compact differentiable manifold can
be encoded as the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of some game. Moreover,
there exist isolated Nash equilibria of arbitrary topological degree.
1. INTRODUCTION
We consider the set of Nash equilibria of an N-person normal form noncooperative
game with perfect information, viewed as the set of solutions to a finite system
of polynomial equations and inequalities. The unknowns in this system are the
components of the mixed strategy selected by each player. A set of real points given
by a system of polynomial equations and inequalities is called a semialgebraic variety,
and the special case when the system does not involve inequalities is called a real
algebraic variety. Thus the set of Nash equilibria of a game is a semialgebraic variety.
The generic finiteness result of Harsanyi (1973) states that for each assignment
of generic payoffs to the normal form of a game, the number of Nash equilibria is
finite and odd. In fact, McKelvey and McLennan (1997) have computed the exact
maximal number of totally mixed Nash equilibria in the generic case. Our results are
complementary; they describe how complex the non-generic case can be. We show
that every real algebraic variety is isomorphic (in a sense to be specified) to the set
of totally mixed Nash equilibria of some game:
Theorem 1. Every real algebraic variety is isomorphic to the set of totally mixed Nash
equilibria of a 3-person game, and also of an N-person game in which each player has two pure
strategies.
The theorem of Nash (1952) and Tognoli (1973) states that every compact dif-
ferentiable manifold is diffeomorphic to some (nonsingular) real algebraic variety.
So, since the isomorphism above is also a diffeomorphism when the variety is non-
singular, it follows from our result that for any compact differentiable manifold M,
there is some game whose set of totally mixed Nash equilibria is diffeomorphic to
either M or a tubular neighborhood of M. Similarly, the theorem of Akbulut and
King (1992) shows that every piecewise linear manifold is homeomorphic to some
real algebraic variety. So for every piecewise linear manifold M, there is some game
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whose set of totally mixed Nash equilibria is homeomorphic to either M or a tubular
neighborhood of M.
Theorem 1 derives from the following more specific results:
Theorem 2. Let S ⊂ Rn be a real algebraic variety given by m polynomial equations in
n unknowns x1, . . . , xn, such that each point (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ S satisfies 0 < xi < 1 for
i = 1, . . . , n and ∑ni=1 xi < 1. Let d be the highest power to which any unknown xi occurs
in any of the m equations. Set D = m ((1+ d)n − 1) and N = nd + m.
(a) there is a 3-person game in which the first player has n + 1 pure strategies, the second
player has D − m + 1 pure strategies, and the third player has D + 1 pure strategies,
whose set of totally mixed Nash equilibria is isomorphic to S.
(b) there is an N-person game in which each player has two pure strategies, whose set of
totally mixed Nash equilibria is isomorphic to S.
Theorem 1 will follow since any real algebraic variety is isomorphic to one satis-
fying the hypotheses of Theorem 2. Note that specifying particular values of n, m,
and d, and/or giving more detailed information about the form of the equations, may
allow using games of smaller formats (fewer pure strategies in (a), fewer players in
(b)). For example,
Theorem 3. Suppose S is the set of those roots of a polynomial of degree d in one unknown
which are real and lie in the open interval (0, 1). Then there is a 3-person game in which the
first player has two pure strategies and the other two players each have dd/2e+1 pure strategies,
such that the projection of the set E of totally mixed Nash equilibria of this game onto its first
component (the probability that the first player picks her first pure strategy) is S, and #E = #S.
The notion of isomorphism being used in this paper is that of stable isomorphism
in the category of semialgebraic varieties. Semialgebraic varieties are the subject of
study in real algebraic geometry. Two semialgebraic varieties are (semialgebraically)
isomorphic if there exists a homeomorphism between them whose graph is a semial-
gebraic set. They are stably isomorphic if they are in the same equivalence class under
the equivalence relation generated by semialgebraic isomorphisms and the (canonical)
projections V × Rk → V for any k. Intuitively, the word “stable” here means that
we are allowed to thicken the objects before mapping them isomorphically to each
other.
The result in this paper is one of a series of “universality theorems” in combi-
natorics. Another example is the theorem of Richter-Gebert and Ziegler (1995),
that realization spaces of 4-polytopes are universal. A polytope has a combinatorial
description as a collection of faces of smaller dimensions, together with the inclusions
between them (which vertices lie in which edges, etc.) The realization space of the
polytope is the set of all geometric polytopes for a given combinatorial polytope, and
the result states that an arbitrary primary semialgebraic set is stably equivalent to the
realization space of some 4-polytope. Other universality theorems were proved by
Mne¨v (1988) and Shor (1991).
2. PRELIMINARIES
A normal form game with a finite number of players, each with a finite number of
pure strategies, is specified as follows. The set of players is denoted as I = {1, . . . ,N}.
Associated to the players are finite disjoint sets of pure strategies S1, . . . ,SN . Write
S = ∏i∈I Si . For each i let di = |Si | − 1, and write the set Si as {si0, . . . , sidi }. The
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set 6i of mixed strategies of player i is the set of all functions σi : Si 7→ [0, 1] with∑
si∈Si σi(si ) = 1. Write 6 =
∏
i∈I 6i for the set of strategy profiles, and write
6−i =
∏
j∈I−{i} 6 j . Write σ−i for the image of σ ∈ 6 under the projection pi−i onto
6−i . Write σ
j
i = σi(si j ) for j = 1, . . . , di and σ 0i = 1.
The game is specified by describing the payoff function ui : S → R for each player.
The ith player’s expected payoff from a strategy profile σ is given by multilinearity as
ui( σ ) =
∑
s∈S
ui(s) σ1(s1) · · · σN (sN ).
By abuse of notation, write ui(si j, σ−i ) for the ith player’s expected payoff from the
strategy σ whose ith component is si j and whose other components are defined by
pi−i( σ ) = σ−i .
At a totally mixed Nash equilibrium, for any given player, if the other players’
mixed strategies are kept fixed then the payoffs at each of that player’s pure strategies
are equal. These conditions can be expressed as a system of polynomial equations
and inequalities. The condition that the strategy profile σ be a totally mixed Nash
equilibrium is precisely that for each i, 0 < σi(si ) < 1 and
(1) ui(si j, σ−i ) = ui(si0, σ−i ) for all j.
We will use a simplified notation for the two special cases dealt with in this paper:
a 3-person game, and an N-person game in which each player has two pure strategies.
The players in the 3-person game will be called Alice, Bob, and Critter. They have
da + 1 = d1 + 1, db + 1 = d2 + 1, and dc + 1 = d3 + 1 pure strategies respectively.
A mixed strategy of Alice will be written a¯ = (a0, . . . , ada ), where ai stands for
σ1(s1i ). Similarly, b¯ = (b0, . . . , bdb ) and c¯ = (c0, . . . , cdc ) denote mixed strategies of
Bob and Critter, respectively. In the N-person game in which each player has two
pure strategies, we will write pi for σi(si1).
3. PROOFS
In the equations (1) for a totally mixed Nash equilibrium, for each player i, if we
substitute σi(si0) = 1 −
∑di
j=1 σi(si j ), and subtract each right-hand side from each
left-hand side, we get di equations:
d1∑
j1=0
· · ·
di−1∑
ji−1=0
di+1∑
ji+1=0
· · ·
dN∑
jN=0
λ
(i)( ji )
j1 ... ji−1 ji+1 ... jN
σ
j1
1 · · · σ ji−1i−1 σ ji+1i+1 · · · σ jNN = 0(2)
where ji ranges from 1 to di .
Lemma 4. If we are given any arbitrary coefficients λ(i)( ji )j1 ... ji−1 ji+1 ... jN , we can choose payoff
functions ui so that the above equations have the prescribed coefficients.
Proof. We first set each player i’s payoff equal to zero whenever they choose their
first pure strategy si0, no matter what the other players do. We show that we can
obtain the equation (2) for i = N and jN = 1, namely
d1∑
j1=0
· · ·
dN−1∑
jN−1=0
λ
(N )(1)
j1 ... jN−1
N−1∏
k=1
σ
jk
k = 0;(3)
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the other cases are completely analogous. The equations (1) imply that
d1∑
j1=0
· · ·
dN−1∑
jN−1=0
uN (s1 j1 , . . . , s(N−1) jN−1 , sN1)
N−1∏
k=1
σk(sk jk ) = 0.(4)
We consider the set of polynomial equations of the above form as a linear space of
dimension (d1 + 1) × · · · × (dN−1 + 1), with basis elements
∏N−1
k=1 σk(sk jk ). The set
of polynomial equations of the form (3) is also a linear space of the same dimension,
with basis elements
∏N−1
k=1 σ
jk
k . Substituting σ
0
k =
∑k
j=0 σk(sk j ) and σ
j
k = σk(sk j )
for j = 1, . . . , dk, for k = 1, . . . ,N − 1 into (3) transforms it from the latter space
to the former. So we obtain the required payoffs uN (s1 j1 , . . . , s(N−1) jN−1 , sN1) as the
coefficients of the transformed equation. 
This lemma, which appears for example in McKelvey and McLennan (1997) or
Sturmfels (2002, Chapter 6), is crucial to the proofs of the following theorems, from
which Theorem 2 follows:
Theorem 5. Let S ⊂ Rn be a real algebraic variety given by m equations in n unknowns
x1, . . . , xn, such that each point (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ S satisfies 0 < xi for i = 1, . . . , n and∑n
i=1 xi < 1, and suppose the highest power of xi in equation j is x
di j
i . Set
D = −1+
m∑
j=1
(1+ d1 j )(1+ d2 j ) · · · (1+ dn j ).
Then there is a 3-person game in which Alice has n + 1 pure strategies, Bob has D − m + 1
pure strategies, and Critter has D+1 pure strategies, whose set of totally mixed Nash equilibria
is isomorphic to S.
Proof. We suppose S to be given by the m equations
Fj(x1, . . . , xn) = 0
for j = 1, . . . ,m. We now consider the equations associated with Critter’s payoffs;
recall that these are equations involving only the ai ’s and bi ’s. We will show how an
arbitrary system of polynomial equations Fj(x1, . . . , xn) = 0 can be encoded in this
system. (We will consider the ci ’s and the equations associated with Alice’s payoffs
and Bob’s payoffs later.) The variables a1, . . . , an will take the roles of x1, . . . , xn.
We will repeatedly use the following observation. Suppose we have a system of
polynomial equations
f1(x1, . . . , xi ) = 0,
...
fk(x1, . . . , xi ) = 0
such that fk(x1, . . . , xi ) = αxi + g(x1, . . . , xi−1) where α is some nonzero constant
coefficient and g is a polynomial in the remaining variables other than xi . Then our
system is logically equivalent to (i.e., it implies and is implied by) the system
f1(x1, . . . , xi−1,−α−1 g(x1, . . . , xi−1, )) = 0,
...,
fk−1(x1, . . . , xi−1,−α−1 g(x1, . . . , xi−1)) = 0,
xi = −α−1 g(x1, . . . , xi−1).
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Effectively we have substituted the value of xi given by the last equation into the
other equations. Notice that the variable xi no longer appears in the first i − 1
equations. In our construction we will actually be going the other way: we will be
starting with a system of equations in fewer variables and adding a new variable xi as
above. The old system defined a variety V lying in Ri−1, and the new system defines
a variety V ′ lying in Ri . The two varieties are isomorphic, with isomorphism given
by the embedding (x1, . . . , xi−1) 7→ (x1, . . . , xi−1,−α−1 g(x1, . . . , xi−1).
Most of the equations in our system will be of the form
b′i = λalb′j + λ′
for some constants λ and λ′, where b′i = sibi + δi for some constants si and δi .
The si ’s and δi ’s are constants with si 6= 0, which we choose so that for any point
(a1, . . . , an) ∈ S, we will have 0 < bi for all i and
∑D−m
i=1 bi < 1. This is possible since
the set S fits inside (0, 1)n.
Write Fj in recursive form as
Fj(x1, . . . , xn) = xd1 j1 Fjd1 j (x2, . . . , xn) + · · · + Fj0(x2, . . . , xn)
= · · · =
= xd1 j1 (x
d2 j
2 · · · (x
dn j
n Fjd1 j ...dn j + · · · ) · · · ) + · · · + Fj0...0
where the Fji1 ...in are constants, the Fji1 ...in−1 are polynomials in an, the Fji1 ...in−2 are
polynomials in an−1 and an, and so forth. We will transform the single equation
0 = Fj(x1, . . . , xn) into a system of many equations. Horner’s rule states that a
univariate polynomial
ξdx
d + ξd−1xd−1 + · · · + ξ1x + ξ0
can be evaluated as
(· · · ((ξdx + ξd−1)x + ξd−2)x + · · · + ξ1)x + ξ0.
Each equation will equate some b′i to one of the parenthesized expressions. Finally
some b′i will equal the univariate polynomial in question. At first the this will be one
of the polynomials Fji1 ...in−1 in an. Then it will be one of the polynomials Fji1 ...in−2 ,
considered as a univariate polynomial in an−1, whose coefficients are the polynomials
Fji1 ...in−1 ; and so forth.
Our first equation is
s1b1 + δ1 = anF1d11 ...dn1 + F1d11 ...d(n−1)1(dn1−1) .
Our second equation is
s2b2 + δ2 = an(s1b1 + δ1) + F1d11 ...d(n−1)1(dn1−2) .
Continuing in this way, our dn1th equation is
sdn1bdn1 + δdn1 = an(s(dn1−1)b(dn1−1) + δ(dn1−1)) + F1d11 ...d(n−1)10.
Observe that the righthand side of this last equation is F1d11 ...d(n−1)1 (an). In the same
way, we obtain all the polynomials F1i1 ...in−1 (an) for i1 = 0, . . . , d11, . . . , in−1 =
0, . . . , d(n−1)1, setting up dn1 equations for each. This takes care of the first k =
(1+d11)(1+d21) · · · (1+d(n−1)1)dn1 equations. Now we start building up the bivariate
polynomials. We begin by constructing d(n−1)1 equations starting with
sk+1bk+1 + δk+1 = an−1(sdn1bdn1 + δdn1 ) + (s2dn1b2dn1 + δ2dn1 ),
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and end up with F1d11 ...d(n−2)1 (an−1, an) on the righthand side. In this way we use
(1+ d11)(1+ d21) · · · (1+ d(n−2)1)d(n−1)1 more equations to obtain all the polynomials
F1i1 ...in−2 (an−1, an) for i1 = 0, . . . , d11,. . . ,in−2 = 0, . . . , d(n−2)1. Continuing in this
manner, we at last end up with the equation 0 = F1(a1, . . . , an). We have used
d11 + (1+ d11)d21 + · · · + (1+ d11)(1+ d21) · · · (1+ d(n−1)1)dn1
= (1+ d11)(1+ d21) · · · (1+ dn1) − 1
equations. In this way we construct D equations to encode all the m equations
0 = Fj(a1, . . . , an). The lefthand sides of each of these equations contains a distinct
bi , except for the m equations 0 = Fj(a1, . . . , an) themselves. Thus we have made the
set of totally mixed Nash equilibria consist exactly of those points (a1, . . . , an) in the
set S, and for each such point we have set the values of all D − m + 1 bi ’s (the last
equation is
∑
bi = 1).
It remains to set the values of the D ci ’s. We have n equations (A) and D − m
equations (B) left, each of which we can use to set some ci equal to 1D . If m > n
there will be m − n ci ’s left over. These are unconstrained except that 0 < ci < 1 and∑
ci = 1. Thus the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria will be a Cartesian product
of S and a product of open simplices, which is stably isomorphic to S. 
Theorem 6. Let S ⊂ Rn be a real algebraic variety given by m equations in n unknowns
x1, . . . , xn, such that each point (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ S satisfies 0 < xi for i = 1, . . . , n and∑n
i=1 xi < 1, and suppose the highest power of xi in equation j is x
di j
i . Set
D ′ =
n∑
i=1
max
j
di j .
Then there is a game with (D ′ + m) players in which each player has 2 pure strategies, whose
set of totally mixed Nash equilibria is isomorphic to S.
Proof. We first give a game with D ′+max{m, n} players. We take the first n variables
p1, . . . , pn to represent x1, . . . , xn. Let di = max j di j , and rename the last D ′ variables
as p11, . . . , p1d1 , . . . , pn1, . . . , pndn . Then the last D
′ equations are
p11 = p1, p12 = p1p11, . . . , p1d1 = p1p1(d1−1);
...
pn1 = pn, pn2 = pnpn1, . . . , pndn = pnpn(dn−1) .
The first m equations are Fj(x1, . . . , xn) = 0 for j = 1, . . . ,m, with xki replaced
by pik. Any remaining equations can be 0 = 0.
Note that this means the first n variables p1, . . . , pn do not occur in the first n
equations. If m > n, the next m−n variables do not occur in any equations. We must
arrange the last D ′ equations such that pi j does not occur in the (i, j)th equation.
Suppose D ′ ≥ 3. For each (i, j), let Ti j be the set of equations in which pi j does
not occur. We will show that for every k = 1, . . . ,D ′, for every subset K of the
indices (i, j) with #K = k we have
#
 ⋃
(i, j)∈K
Ti j
 ≥ k.
Since each pi j occurs in at most two equations, for each (i, j) we have #Ti j ≥ D ′−2 ≥
1. For any (i, j) and (i ′, j′) with (i ′, j′) 6= (i, j), since there is at most one equation
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in which both pi j and pi ′ j ′ occur, we have #
(
Ti j ∪ Ti ′ j ′
) ≥ D ′ − 1 ≥ 2. Finally, for
any three distinct pairs (i, j), (i ′, j′), and (i ′′, j′′), there is no equation in which all of
pi j , pi ′ j ′ , and pi ′ ′ , j ′ ′ occur, so #
(
Ti j ∪ Ti ′ j ′ ∪ Ti ′ ′ j ′ ′
) = D ′. The assertion follows since
k ≤ D ′. Now the existence of the desired arrangement follows from Hall’s marriage
theorem.
Suppose D ′ ≤ 2. If D ′ = 1, we do not actually need the equation p11 = p1. Recall
that we had replaced x1 by p11 in the first m equations, Fj(x1) = 0 for j = 1, . . . ,m.
Instead, we put p11 = 12 for the very first equation, replace x1 by p1 in the next
m− 1 equations F2(x1) = 0, . . . ,Fm(x1) = 0, and also replace x1 by p1 in the (1, 1)th
equation F1(x1) = 0. If D ′ = 2, then either d1 = 1 and d2 = 1, so the (1, 1) equation
is p21 = p2 and the (2, 1) equation is p11 = p1; or d1 = 2. In this case, n = 1; our
game has m + 2 players. Write the polynomials Fj(x1) as Fj(x1) = a jx21 + b jx1 + c j
for j = 1, . . . ,m. Then the m+ 2 equations are
(1) a1p(m+1) p(m+2) + b1p(m+1) + c1 = 0,
(2) a2p1p(m+1) + b2p1 + c2 = 0,
...
(m) amp1p(m+1) + bmp1 + cm = 0,
(m+ 1) p(m+2) = p1,
(m+ 2) p(m+1) = p1.
Now we have encoded S in a game with D ′ + max{m, n} players. It remains to
show that we only need D ′ + m players. So suppose n > m. Above, we have used
di equations pi1 = pi , . . . , pidi = pi pi(di−1), but we could have gotten away with
di − 1 equations instead if we were willing to use pi in the equations encoding the
polynomials Fj(x1, . . . , xn) = 0. In that case all the variables p1, . . . , pn and all the
pi j ’s might occur in each of the equations Fj(x1, . . . , xn) = 0, so they could not be
associated with any of the players associated with those variables. Instead one might
have to introduce m new players with whom to associate these equations. Now the
equations associated with the players whose variables are p1, . . . , pn are free; since
n > m these can be used to fix the variables associated with the m new players at
1
2 . 
The values of D and D ′ in Theorem 2 are obtained by setting di j = d for all i
and j. Theorem 1 follows since R is semialgebraically isomorphic to (−1, 1) by the
change of variables t 7→ t/(1− t2) and (−1, 1) is isomorphic to (0, 1) by the change of
variables t 7→ (t+1)/2; then since the new xi ’s take values in (0, 1), their sum
∑n
i=1 xi
takes values in some interval (0, δ), and dividing them all by δ lets us achieve the
hypotheses of Theorems 5 and 6. Now the map t 7→ t/(1− t2), when considered as a
map from R to the whole line R, is not one-to-one but one-to-two. So the image of
our real algebraic variety under this map will have several pieces, but the piece lying in
the interior of the n-cube (−1, 1)× · · ·× (−1, 1) will be semialgebraically isomorphic
to the original variety (and will not be connected to any other piece). Note that
when the real algebraic variety is given by no more equations than unknowns, the
isomorphism we exhibit in Theorems 5 and 6 is a homeomorphism.
In the game constructed in the proof of Theorem 6, the payoffs for many of the
players depend only on the mixed strategies chosen by two or three of the other
players. This is why the game is not generic. At the same time, this can happen very
naturally in situations where the players interact locally. These local interactions can
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be described by a graph. Such graphical models are studied by Kearns, Littman, and
Singh (2001).
As mentioned before, in many cases games of smaller formats can be used. In
particular, we restate Theorem 3 and prove it here:
Theorem 7. Let S be the set of those roots of one polynomial equation αdad + · · · + α0 = 0
in one unknown a which are real and lie in the interval (0, 1). Then S is the set of first
coordinates of the totally mixed Nash equilibria of a 3-person game in which Alice has two pure
strategies and the Bob and Critter each have dd/2e + 1 pure strategies.
Proof. Suppose d is even, say d = 2e. We set Alice’s payoffs so that equating them
yields ce = b1. We set Bob’s payoffs so that equating them yields the e equations
0 = α0 + a(s1c1 + δ1),
s1c1 + δ1 = α1 + a(s2c2 + δ2),
...
se−1ce−1 + δe−1 = αe−1 + a(se ce + δe );
and we set Critter’s payoffs so that equating them yields the e equations
seb1 + δe = αe + a(se+1b2 + δe+1),
se+1b2 + δe+1 = αe+1 + a(se+2b3 + δe+2),
...
s2e−2be−1 + δ2e−2 = α2e−2 + a(s2e−1be + δ2e−1),
s2e−1be + δ2e−1 = α2e−1 + aα2e .
As in the proof of Theorem 5, the si ’s and δi ’s are constants with si 6= 0 chosen so
that 0 < bi , 0 < ci ,
∑e
i=1 bi < 1, and
∑e
i=1 ci < 1, for all a ∈ S.
Suppose d is odd, say d = 2e − 1. Then we replace the last of Critter’s equations
by
be =
1
2
− 1
2
(b1 + · · · + be−1).

In the proof of Theorem 5, Alice’s and Bob’s equations were essentially wasted.
On the other hand, in the proof of Theorem 7, we started the same way, multiplying
out the polynomial according to Horner’s rule and accumulating the result in one
of the ci ’s. But then we used one of Alice’s equations to transfer the result to the
bi ’s, so we could continue the calculation using these variables. This can be done
in many cases (although in general there may be more results that would have to be
transferred than Alice’s equations could accomodate).
Although we have stated our results in the geometric language of varieties, our
proofs are purely algebraic and require few assumptions. Experts may note that this
means our results are actually more general than what we have stated: they concern
schemes, which generalize varieties.
4. A SPECIAL CASE
We can apply the above construction to the case when the polynomials defining
the totally mixed Nash equilibrium are (x2−y2, 2xy), which is the canonical example
of a map from the plane to itself of degree 2; considering the plane as having complex
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coordinate z = x+ iy, it is given by z 7→ z2. Thus, this results in a game with a single
isolated totally mixed Nash equilibrium of degree 2. Every map z 7→ zn for n ∈ N
similarly gives rise to a system of two polynomial equations in two variables, and
so we can obtain a unique totally mixed Nash equilibrium of any given topological
degree.
5. CONCLUSION
Although the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria might comprise an arbitrary real
algebraic variety, this does not mean it cannot be computed. As mentioned before,
generically this set is finite. As described by Sturmfels (2002, Chapter 6), it is the set
of solutions to a system of polynomial equations, which can be found, for instance,
using polyhedral homotopy continuation software such as PHCpack by Verschelde
(1999). Recently Sommese and Verschelde (2000) have been working on extending
these methods to positive dimensional algebraic sets (e.g., curves and surfaces rather
than isolated points). Indeed, how to solve systems of polynomial equations is a very
active area of research.
Since Nash equilibria are usually not unique, the way that players approach equi-
librium dynamically in repeated games under assumptions of imperfect information
and/or bounded rationality has been studied both theoretically and experimentally.
For example, Kalai and Lehrer (1993) showed that under certain assumptions, “ra-
tional learning leads to Nash equilibrium.” The existence of equilibrium sets with
varying geometry and topology suggests that in these same dynamical models, inter-
esting phenomena might continue to occur after equilibrium has been reached.
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